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BEYOND BITCOIN: 
ISSUES IN REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN 
TRANSACTIONS 
TREVOR I. KIVIAT† 
ABSTRACT 
  The buzz surrounding Bitcoin has reached a fever pitch. Yet in 
academic legal discussions, disproportionate emphasis is placed on 
bitcoins (that is, virtual currency), and little mention is made of 
blockchain technology—the true innovation behind the Bitcoin 
protocol. Simply, blockchain technology solves an elusive networking 
problem by enabling “trustless” transactions: value exchanges over 
computer networks that can be verified, monitored, and enforced 
without central institutions (for example, banks). This has broad 
implications for how we transact over electronic networks.  
  This Note integrates current research from leading computer 
scientists and cryptographers to elevate the legal community’s 
understanding of blockchain technology and, ultimately, to inform 
policymakers and practitioners as they consider different regulatory 
schemes. An examination of the economic properties of a blockchain-
based currency suggests the technology’s true value lies in its potential 
to facilitate more efficient digital-asset transfers. For example, 
applications of special interest to the legal community include more 
efficient document and authorship verification, title transfers, and 
contract enforcement. Though a regulatory patchwork around virtual 
currencies has begun to form, its careful analysis reveals much 
uncertainty with respect to these alternative applications. 
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The circulation of confidence is better than the circulation of 
money. 
 – James Madison1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 26, 2014, three million homes nationwide tuned in 
to watch the North Carolina State Wolfpack take on the University of 
Central Florida Knights in the Bitcoin St. Petersburg Bowl—the first 
of several bitcoin-branded, postseason college bowl games.2 ESPN’s 
online presale, held open to sports fans across the nation, involved 
one catch: prospective attendees could only purchase the tickets with 
bitcoin.3 This episode was the first of many that collectively exemplify 
the mainstreaming of virtual currencies—an atmosphere most 
recently dominated by the acts of financial players,4 such as the New 
 
 1. Statement of James Madison at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 4 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 538 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). As this Note illustrates, Bitcoin’s core 
innovation is not the controversial “virtual currency”; rather, it is the facilitation of “trustless” 
electronic transactions. In other words, blockchain transactions allow each party to 
independently verify that it is not being defrauded, without the involvement of a trusted 
intermediary, such as a bank or other financial institution. This is the circulation of confidence.  
 2. Tony Gallippi, ESPN and BitPay Enter 3-Year Deal To Produce NCAA Bowl Game, 
BITPAY BLOG (June 18, 2014), http://blog.bitpay.com/2014/06/18/espn-and-bitpay-enter-3-year-
deal-to-produce-ncaa-bowl-game.html [http://perma.cc/9RAT-WMDS]. 
 3. Tony Gallippi, Get Ready for the Bitcoin Bowl, BITPAY BLOG (Oct. 15, 2014), https://
blog.bitpay.com/get-ready-for-the-bitcoin-bowl [http://perma.cc/H6QF-GQLB]. 
 4. See, e.g., Clint Boulton, BNY Mellon Explores Bitcoin’s Potential, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 
2015, 6:19 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/04/05/bny-mellon-explores-bitcoins-potential 
[http:// perma.cc/9NQL-N9FV] (describing how Bank of New York Mellon is experimenting 
with blockchain technology); Grace Caffyn, Barclays Trials Bitcoin Tech With Pilot Program, 
COINDESK (June 22, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/barclays-trials-bitcoin-tech-with-
pilot-program [http://perma.cc/DDH2-J5ZU] (detailing Barclay’s signing off on a proof-of-
concept to trial blockchain technology); Grace Caffyn, RBS Trials Ripple as Part of £3.5 Billion 
Tech Revamp, COINDESK (June 26, 2015, 2:03 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/rbs-trials-ripple-
part-3-5-billion-tech-revamp [http://perma.cc/PZS8-5NK8] (describing Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
efforts to integrate blockchain-based technology as part of a technological revamp); Nasdaq 
Launches Enterprise-Wide Blockchain Technology Initiative, NASDAQ (May 11, 2015), 
http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=912196 [http://perma.cc/GH2Z-KQGZ] 
(detailing Nasdaq’s blockchain technology initiative); Nathanial Popper, When Goldman Sachs 
Began Flirting with Bitcoin, AM. BANKER (May 21, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/
bankthink/when-goldman-sachs-began-flirting-with-bitcoin-1074472-1.html [http://perma.cc/3C
BJ-7AUY] (profiling Goldman Sachs’s interest in blockchain technology). 
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York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and state regulators,5 such as New 
York’s Department of Financial Services (NYDFS). 
Bitcoin discussions largely focus on the technology’s well-
publicized growing pains: wild price volatility;6 fraudulent investment 
schemes;7 multimillion dollar hacks;8 and the infamous Silk Road 
case9—an episode that resulted in a life sentence for Ross Ulbricht,10 
drug kingpin of the deep web,11 and the indictment of two federal 
agents.12 Accordingly, some intelligent and well-respected detractors 
 
 5. New York was first. The list now includes California and North Carolina. Additionally, 
legislators in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are considering 
various proposals. Peter Van Valkenburgh, Tracking Bitcoin Regulation State by State, COIN 
CENTER (June 2, 2015), https://coincenter.org/2015/06/tracking-bitcoin-regulation-state-by-state 
[https://perma.cc/U646-8K59]. 
 6. See Market Price (USD), BLOCKCHAIN.INFO, https://blockchain.info/charts/market-
price [http://perma.cc/JPQ9-AZNR] (providing historical and real-time price data). 
 7. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *14, *21–25 (E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 18, 2014) (finding an interest in a bitcoin-based Ponzi scheme to be an “investment 
contract” for purposes of U.S. securities laws and imposing civil monetary penalties under the 
Securities Act); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces 
Charges Against Two Florida Men For Operating An Underground Bitcoin Exchange (July 21, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-against-
two-florida-men-operating-underground [https://perma.cc/T3QF-D97T] (describing charges 
brought against defendants who operated a federal credit union as a captive bank for their 
illegal business). 
 8. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, $1.2m Hack Shows Why You Should Never Store Bitcoins 
on the Internet, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/inputs [http://
perma.cc/FD5L-2ZCU] (reporting on a hack suffered by inputs.io, a wallet software provider); 
Amir Mizroch, Large Bitcoin Exchange Halts Trading After Hack, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS BLOG 
(Jan. 6, 2015, 4:13 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/06/large-bitcoin-exchange-halts-
trading-after-hack [http://perma.cc/5L8K-LZZX] (reporting on a hack on “[o]ne of the largest 
bitcoin exchanges”). 
 9. See generally Joshuah Bearman, The Rise and Fall of Silk Road: Part I, WIRED (Apr. 
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1 [http://perma.cc/LE7G-HM6T] (detailing the 
Silk Road case); Joshuah Bearman, The Rise and Fall of Silk Road: Part II, WIRED (May 2015), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/05/silk-road-2 [https://perma.cc/9XH5-XFLK] (same).  
 10. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Ross Ulbricht, A/K/A “Dread Pirate Roberts,” 
Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison (May 29, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
usao-sdny/pr/ross-ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-sentenced-manhattan-federal-court-life-
prison [http://perma.cc/9LBY-X8XF]. 
 11. The deep web is a “portion of the Internet that is hidden from conventional search 
engines, as by encryption,” such as the Tor network, often used for illegal or criminal activity. 
See Deep Web, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/deep-web?s=t 
[http://perma.cc/2KMN-B42K]. For an interactive, nautical-themed representation of this 
concept, see What Is the Deep Web?, CNN MONEY (Mar. 10, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://
money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-the-deep-web [http://perma.cc/8R3B-4ECT]. 
 12. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Federal Agents Charged with Bitcoin Money 
Laundering & Wire Fraud (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/sanfrancisco/press-releases/2015/
former-federal-agents-charged-with-bitcoin-money-laundering-and-wire-fraud [https://perma.cc/
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have called it a “bubble,”13 and others have gone so far as to call it 
“evil.”14 Nevertheless, technologists and business leaders have 
declared it “better than currency,”15 citing its promise to lower 
transaction costs,16 transform developing economies,17 and generally 
“reshape [the financial] system.”18 Simply put, sensationalism in this 
area is high.19 Perhaps this is encouraged by the facts, which read like 
a science fiction novel, blurring the physical and digital worlds:20 A 
pseudonymous inventor21 releases a cryptographic22 technology that 
 
4J3P-V248]. 
 13. Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, 
at BU4. Professor Shiller was awarded the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences along with 
Professors Eugene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen for their research into market prices and asset 
bubbles. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2013, 
NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/
laureates/2013 [http://perma.cc/6XEW-GUG6]. 
 14. Paul Krugman, Bitcoin is Evil, N.Y. TIMES: CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Dec. 28, 2013, 
2:35 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil [http://perma.cc/8K5G-
W62Y]. 
 15. Kim Lachance Shandrow, Bill Gates: Bitcoin is ‘Better than Currency’, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/238103 [http://perma.cc/LTM4-UUJJ]. 
 16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-496, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: 
EMERGING REGULATORY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION CHALLENGES 
23 (2014). 
 17. See JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 
14–15 (2013) (describing bitcoin’s potential to improve the lives of the world’s most 
impoverished individuals); Kyle Torpey, Five Economies that Could Actually Use Bitcoin, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 30, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/five-
economies-that-could-actually-use-bitcoin [http://perma.cc/G34G-QCV9] (profiling prospects 
for bitcoin to support financial modernization in developing countries). 
 18. Marc Andreesen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:54 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters [http://perma.cc/HW64-TH
PB]. 
 19. Here is a sampling of the “greatest hits” of sensationalist headlines: John Mauldin, Is 
Bitcoin the Future?, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 11:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
johnmauldin/2014/12/01/is-bitcoin-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/LJ97-FZEJ]; Jose Pagliery, Ron 
Paul: Bitcoin Could ‘Destroy the Dollar’, CNN MONEY (Dec. 4, 2013, 12:01 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/04/technology/bitcoin-libertarian [http://perma.cc/4D2X-V6MW]; 
Jonathan M. Trugman, Welcome to 21st-Century Ponzi Scheme: Bitcoin, N.Y. POST (Feb. 15, 
2014, 5:08 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/02/15/welcome-to-21st-century-ponzi-scheme-bitcoin 
[http://perma.cc/R8FP-9ZRH]; Tim Worstall, So, That’s the End of Bitcoin Then, FORBES (June 
20, 2011, 4:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/06/20/so-thats-the-end-of-
bitcoin-then [http://perma.cc/3AE4-9L4L]. 
 20. For a particularly entertaining work blending the real and synthetic, see PHILIP K. 
DICK, DO ANDROIDS DREAM OF ELECTRIC SHEEP? (1968). 
 21. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Will the Real Satoshi Nakamoto Please Stand Up?, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 11, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/will-the-real-
satoshi-nakamoto-please-stand-up [https://perma.cc/5739-DSVB] (exploring the intrigue 
regarding the true identity of the Bitcoin architect). 
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incentivizes armies of supercomputers23 to mine digital assets24 that 
can be traded for real-world goods and services.25 
Further, authors almost exclusively focus on bitcoin as a currency 
system. For example, authors have weighed the costs and benefits of 
transacting with virtual currencies,26 considered the sustainability of 
virtual currencies,27 and contemplated the application of existing 
regulatory schemes to virtual currency.28 Missing from the dialogue is 
a deeper perspective on the technology. 
This Note offers that perspective. Primarily, it expands on 
contemporary academic literature by highlighting the conceptual 
distinction between bitcoins (that is, virtual currency) and the 
“blockchain,”29 the Bitcoin platform’s key technological innovation. It 
 
 22. Cryptography is “the scientific study of techniques for securing digital information, 
transactions, and distributed computations.” JONATHAN KATZ & YEHUDA LINDELL, 
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES AND PROTOCOLS 3 (2007). 
 23. Bitcoin: The Magic of Mining, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2015, at 58, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21638124 [http://perma.cc/UB2F-2EL7]; Ashlee Vance & Brad 
Stone, The Bitcoin-Mining Arms Race Heats Up, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/bitcoin-mining-chips-gear-computing-groups-
competition-heats-up [http://perma.cc/6XK3-KVYJ]. 
 24. A digital asset is essentially any digital file with economic properties that generate 
value, such as consumption or transfer rights. TOBIAS BLANKE, DIGITAL ASSET ECOSYSTEMS: 
RETHINKING CROWDS AND CLOUDS 8 (2014). 
 25. Over 100,000 merchants accept payments in bitcoin as of the publication of this Note. 
Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Now Accepted by 100,000 Merchants Worldwide, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 3:34 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-now-accepted-by-100000-
merchants-worldwide-1486613 [http://perma.cc/Y26K-FMCB]. 
 26. See, e.g., Joshua J. Doguet, Comment, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory 
Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1130 (2013) 
(arguing that bitcoin benefits users by cutting out financial intermediaries—that is, lowers 
transaction costs—which makes possible even smaller transactions). 
 27. See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 174–81 (2012) (considering the sustainability of bitcoin and concluding 
that bitcoin is not doomed). 
 28. See, e.g., Ruoke Yang, When is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2014) (federal securities regulation); Kelsey L. Penrose, Note, 
Banking On Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. 
BANKING INST. J. 529, 529 (2014) (anti-money-laundering schemes); see also Paul H. Farmer, Jr., 
Comment, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & The Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 85, 86 (2014) (exploring the appropriate legal definition for “bitcoins,” based 
upon their intended and actual use); Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Note, Coining Bitcoin’s “Legal-
Bits”: Examining The Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 587, 596 (2014) (contemplating whether and which existing legal frameworks may be 
used to regulate bitcoin). 
 29. The blockchain is also referred to as the “Bitcoin protocol.” Drawing Distinction 
Between the Uppercase “B” and Lowercase “b” in Bitcoin, BLOCKCHAIN (Dec. 29, 2014), 
http://blog.blockchain.com/2014/12/29/drawing-the-distinction-between-the-uppercase-b-and-
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does this by integrating current research from leading computer 
scientists and cryptographers.30 And its ultimate aim is to elevate the 
legal community’s understanding of blockchain technology and, 
ultimately, to inform policymakers and practitioners as they consider 
different regulatory regimes. 
In short, the blockchain is a “trustless” technology.31 “Trustless” 
means—for the first time in history—exchanges for value over a 
computer network can be verified, monitored, and enforced without 
the presence of a trusted third party or central institution.32 Because 
the blockchain is an authentication and verification technology,33 it 
can enable more efficient title transfers and ownership verification.34 
Because it is programmable, it can enable conditional “smart” 
contracts.35 Because it is decentralized, it can perform these functions 
with minimal trust without using centralized institutions.36 Because it 
is borderless and frictionless, it can provide a cheaper, faster 
infrastructure for exchanging units of value.37 
Simply, blockchain technology has broad implications for how 
we transact, and the potential for innovation is hard to overstate.38 
Regardless of one’s opinion on the merits of virtual currencies, 
financial regulators must develop a better understanding of 
blockchain technology’s impact potential as they continue to engage 
in its pragmatic regulation. 
 
lowercase-b-in-bitcoin [http://perma.cc/6TGY-9P6W]. A capital “B” is associated with the 
protocol and the community; for example, “The Bitcoin ecosystem consists of a wide swath of 
activities, businesses, and services.” A lowercase “b” is associated specifically with the virtual 
currency; for example, “My favorite local coffee shop now accepts payments in bitcoin.” 
 30. See supra note 22 (defining cryptography). 
 31. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 8 
(2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW6Y-WSCR]. 
 32. Id.  
 33. ADAM BACK ET AL., ENABLING BLOCKCHAIN INNOVATIONS THROUGH PEGGED 
SIDECHAINS 7 (2014), http://www.blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf [http://perma.cc/995Y-ALF8]. 
 34. Id. at 4, 15–16. 
 35. Id. at 4. 
 36. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 1. 
 37. See TIM SWANSON, GREAT CHAIN OF NUMBERS: A GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS, 
SMART PROPERTY AND TRUSTLESS ASSET MANAGEMENT 67 (2014) (describing math-based 
“cryptocurrencies” such as bitcoin as an alternative to the often slow and expensive money 
transfers). 
 38. One might use venture capital investment data as a rough proxy for perceived 
innovation opportunities in this area. Total investments in the technology—both venture capital 
and strategic—are estimated to be over $1 billion. Jose Pagliery, Record $1 Billion Invested in 
Bitcoin Firms So Far, CNN MONEY (Nov. 3, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/
11/02/technology/bitcoin-1-billion-invested [http://perma.cc/88HT-GGKB]. 
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This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces blockchain 
technology and its most widely understood application: money 
transfers and payments with bitcoin. First, it explains how blockchain 
transactions occur and why this technology is highly innovative. 
Second, it explores bitcoin’s economic properties and situates the 
currency within the long evolution of monetary technology. Drawing 
on economic perspectives, it highlights the benefits and drawbacks of 
a blockchain-based currency like bitcoin. Part I concludes that the 
technology’s most valuable utility lies beyond bitcoin—in other 
words, not as a currency but as an exchange medium for digital-asset 
transfers. 
Part II surveys the emerging regulatory landscape, which is 
heavily premised on the technology’s singular application as a virtual 
currency. First, it explains the current federal scheme—a patchwork 
of bitcoin-specific guidance and rulings from the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), paired with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) oversight authority and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement 
capabilities, which both apply in highly limited circumstances. Next, it 
explores recent state action—namely, New York’s BitLicense, with 
special attention to its key provisions and ambiguities.39 At each layer 
of regulation, it examines open issues that present uncertainty and 
opportunity for further clarification. 
Part III raises issues presented by blockchain technology beyond 
virtual currency—beyond bitcoin. It covers applications of special 
interest to the legal community including more efficient contracts, 
document and authorship verification, and title transfers. It also 
explores more advanced aspects of the technology, an understanding 
of which is essential for sensible policy making in this area. After 
exploring the vistas beyond bitcoin, this Note concludes by offering 
thoughts on how caution and restraint might be exercised in the law 
to facilitate technological and economic growth. 
 
 39. As this Note goes to press, other states are taking significant steps—most notably, 
California and North Carolina. Valkenburgh, supra note 5. For timely updates relating to 
regulation of bitcoin and other virtual currencies, see Virtual Currency Regulation Resources, 
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, http://bitcoin-reg.com [http://perma.cc/RAY6-4QGJ]. 
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I.  THE BLOCKCHAIN, PART 1: BITCOIN, A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED 
CURRENCY 
Experiments in currency are as old as commerce and civilization 
itself.40 Today, most currencies—the U.S. dollar included—are fiat 
currencies.41 Fiat currencies are not backed by physical assets;42 rather, 
they are backed by the promise of their issuing government.43 
Commodity monies, by contrast, are backed by a tradable, naturally 
scarce resource with value beyond its use in trade.44 Gold or silver, for 
example, backed the U.S. dollar for much of our nation’s history.45 
This Section explains why bitcoin, the blockchain-based “virtual 
currency,” does not fit comfortably into either of these traditional 
categories. 
First, this Section answers the fundamental question, “What is 
bitcoin?” by explaining the lifecycle of a blockchain transaction. 
Second, it examines the economic properties of an artificial 
commodity like bitcoin as compared to well-known and widely traded 
physical commodities and traditional fiat currencies. Finally, it 
highlights the special properties of this technology—core features that 
not only enable blockchain-based currencies but also hold vast 
potential for applications beyond bitcoin. 
 
 40. See generally GLYN DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO 
MODERN DAY (3d ed. 2002) (documenting the history of currency). 
 41. Id. at 355. 
 42. In other words, the holder of a paper Federal Reserve Note does not have the right to 
any amount of an asset—for example, gold or silver, from the government. Id. at 642. 
 43. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012) (“United States coins and currency . . . are legal tender for 
all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”). 
 44. 1 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY: THE PURE THEORY OF MONEY 
14 (1930). Monetary economists sometimes refer to this as “intrinsic value”—think gold, silver, 
tobacco, and cocoa beans. ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS: 
PRINCIPLES IN ACTION 246 (2003). 
 45. See generally George Selgin, The Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard in the United 
States, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS (June 20, 2013), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pub
s/pdf/pa729_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3YT-WT4Y] (reviewing the history of the gold standard 
in the United States). 
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A. The Blockchain: “Triple-Entry Accounting”46 on a Transparent, 
Public Ledger 
In the physical world, security requires locks, vaults, and 
signatures; in the digital world, it requires cryptography, or 
techniques for securing digital information and transactions.47 The 
blockchain is a cryptographic technology.48 It is the core innovation 
driving the bitcoin currency system, and it solves an important 
technological problem. For the first time ever, secure electronic 
transfers of value can occur without the presence of a trusted third 
party.49 By contrast, outside of the blockchain, electronic transfers of 
value require financial intermediaries—for example, commercial 
banks, brokerages, or PayPal—to establish trust and security in the 
transaction.50 Such institutions establish trust and security by 
preserving a centralized ledger51 to track account holders’ balances 
and, ultimately, vouch for a transaction’s authenticity.52 Without 
intermediaries, electronic units of value—dollars, for instance—can 
be copied and spent twice, just as any digital document can be copied 
ad infinitum.53 This “double spending problem”54 has riddled 
programmers for decades.55 
 
 46. Modern financial accounting is a double-entry system—a system of recordkeeping that 
allows firms to maintain records of what the firm owns and owes and what the firm has earned 
and spent over any given period of time. Triple-entry accounting refers to the idea that 
transactions on the blockchain are essentially accounting entries that are cryptographically 
sealed, preventing tampering and enabling near-real-time auditing. 
 47. KATZ & LINDELL, supra note 22, at 3. 
 48. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 1. 
 49. Id. at 8. 
 50. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES IN ADVANCING PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES 173–83 (2011) (chronicling the 
development and growth of online payment intermediaries). 
 51. This used to be a physical ledger; now it is a centralized server network. See 
BRIJENDRA SINGH, NETWORK SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT 323 (3d ed. 2012) (describing 
how centralized server networks are utilized for Internet banking). 
 52. Id. 
 53. The recorded music industry is still recovering from the painful implications of this fact. 
See David Byrne, David Byrne’s Survival Strategies for Emerging Artists—and Megastars, 
WIRED (Dec. 18, 2007), http://archive.wired.com/entertainment/music/magazine/16-01/ff_byrne?
currentPage=all [http://perma.cc/7EPD-Q8L9] (explaining how peer-to-peer file sharing 
transformed the economic model of the recorded music industry). 
 54. The double-spending problem is also referred to as the “Two Generals’ Problem,” and 
is illustrated best through the following hypothetical: Imagine two generals, each preparing his 
troops to attack a common enemy. Each squadron is situated on separate hills, flanking the 
enemy. The generals can communicate only by courier. Each message sent carries a risk of 
interception by the enemy. While the two generals have agreed to attack, they have not agreed 
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Blockchain technology enables secure electronic transactions 
without a centralized ledger and without double spending.56 Instead of 
a centralized ledger, it makes a collective accounting by distributing a 
shared (that is, decentralized) public ledger—a complete record of all 
past transactions on the network.57 This ledger is the blockchain.58 
When two parties wish to engage in a transaction, they must 
broadcast it to the entire network,59 effectively asking network 
participants to determine its authenticity.60 The following example 
illustrates this process. 
Party A begins by broadcasting a message to the network 
signaling the terms of the agreement.61 For example, “I, Party A, am 
giving Party B one bitcoin.” Next, Party B accepts the transaction by 
broadcasting its acceptance to the entire network62 and asking 
network participants to determine the authenticity of the 
transaction.63 The network automatically validates the transaction—or 
guards against the threat of double spending—through a “proof-of-
work” validation system.64 If the transaction is validated, the ledger is 
 
upon a time. Assume that a successful attack requires both squadrons to attack the city 
simultaneously. The issue, then, is that the two generals must agree on an attack time, and each 
general must know that the other general knows they have agreed. This is difficult because 
acknowledgement of receipt can be lost as easily as the original message. Thus, a potentially 
infinite chain of messages is required to reach consensus. See Jim Gray, IBM RES. 
LABORATORY, Notes on Data Base Operating Systems, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER 
SCIENCE 394, 465 (G. Goos & J. Hartmanis eds., 1978), http://research.microsoft.com/en-
us/um/people/gray/papers/DBOS.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5ZV-RZ7C] (coining the name “Two 
Generals’ Problem”); see also E. A. Akkoyunlu, K. Ekanadham & R. V. Huber, Some 
Constraints and Tradeoffs in the Design of Network Communications, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FIFTH ACM SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES 67, 73 (J.C. Browne & Juan 
Rodriguez-Rosell eds., 1975) (documenting the problem for the first time). 
 55. See Gray, supra note 54, at 466 (describing the problem as having no solution in 1978).  
 56. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 8. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. See id. (explaining that transactions are recorded in a series of blocks). Although the 
term “blockchain” was not used in Nakamoto’s original paper, it has become synonymous with 
this technology because transaction data is encoded in blocks that, together, make a chain of all 
past transactions. BACK ET AL., supra note 33, at 3. 
 59. BACK ET AL., supra note 33, at 3–4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 3. “Broadcasting,” in telecommunication and 
information theory, refers to the method of transferring a message to all recipients or network 
participants simultaneously. ANDREW S. TANENBAUM & DAVID J. WETHERALL, COMPUTER 
NETWORKS 17 (5th ed. 2012). In this case, that message is, “I accept the transaction.”  
 63. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 4.  
 64. Id. at 3–4. 
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updated65 and network users’ blockchain records are collectively 
updated.66 In other words, once a transaction has been recorded in 
this transparent public ledger, that transaction cannot be changed 
after the fact (unless it is matched with a second offsetting 
transaction).67 
The proof-of-work validation system is essentially a competition 
among network participants to validate transactions.68 Network users 
participate in this competition by exercising computational power.69 
Under this system, a user’s ability to improperly influence 
validation—to double spend—is limited by the total proportional 
computation power he can harness.70 Users are incentivized to bear 
the computational costs of validation because successful participants 
are rewarded with new bitcoin.71 Accordingly, new bitcoins are said to 
have been “mined,” with the “[computational] time and electricity 
that is expended” as “analogous to gold miners expending resources 
to add gold to circulation.”72 Eventually there will be nothing left to 
mine because the total outstanding supply is limited.73 When that 
 
 65. Alternatively, a request for a dishonest transaction falls off the chain and therefore the 
transaction never occurs. 
 66. BACK, supra note 33, at 3–4. In this respect, the blockchain can be thought of as a 
historical record of all transactions that have occurred on the network. 
 67. Id. at 1. But see Stop Saying Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t Reversible, ELI DOURADO 
(Dec. 4, 2013), https://elidourado.com/blog/bitcoin-arbitration [https://perma.cc/5XW3-YU5Y] 
(describing advanced features of blockchain technology that may essentially provide users with 
the ability to encode transactions to include arbitration and similar dispute-resolution services). 
 68. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 3. The transactions are time-stamped to ensure validity. 
Id. at 2. 
 69. Id. at 2. 
 70. “Computation power” essentially refers to how fast a machine can perform an 
operation. See generally AKEO ADACHI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER THEORY (1990). The 
merits of this validation scheme are apparent when compared to a hypothetical alternative. 
Imagine a scheme in which validation is influenced by the number of network identities the user 
controls instead of his computational power. Although the marginal cost of acquiring more 
identities is nearly zero, the marginal cost of amassing greater computational power is quite 
significant. Accordingly, the scheme that properly deters participants from cheating, or double 
spending, is the one that raises the costs of cheating to a point of impracticability. See 
NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 4, 8 (asserting that the structure of Bitcoin makes cheating 
“computationally impractical”). 
 71. NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 4. Similarly, users are disincentivized from double 
spending because the economic cost of doing so, as measured by the computation power 
required, outweighs the benefits that could be gained in a given transaction. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Grinberg, supra note 27, at 163 (explaining that the rate of bitcoins issued declines by 
half every four years and that the number of bitcoins approaches but never reaches the total 
supply of 21 million). 
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happens, the incentive to validate transactions will likely be 
transaction fees.74 Importantly, this is an open-source protocol, 
meaning open innovation can occur around the technology’s various 
parameters.75 
In sum, the blockchain establishes trust between two parties to a 
transaction through both a decentralized public ledger and a 
cryptographic mechanism that ensures transactions cannot be 
changed after the fact.76 One can easily see why the creator of this 
technology called it “purely peer-to-peer . . . electronic cash.”77 
Leaving aside counterfeiting, physical transactions—routine cash 
transactions, for instance—have never quite suffered from these acute 
problems of trust and assurance.78 Yet for the reasons described 
above,79 simple two-party exchanges of value over electronic networks 
could not occur prior to the blockchain innovation. 
B. The Economic Properties of a Blockchain-Based Currency 
This Section now explores the economic properties of a 
blockchain-based currency like bitcoin. It examines its basic economic 
qualities, as compared to commodity money (like gold) and fiat 
money (like banknotes). It summarizes the key arguments for and 
against a blockchain-based currency and concludes that, whatever 
one’s normative views regarding the desirability of such a currency, 
the technology’s distinctive features indisputably hold potential for 
the efficient transfer of all sorts of digital value. 
Innovation and disruption in the “technology of money”80 is not 
new;81 this competitive landscape has existed for thousands of years. 
 
 74. See Kerem Kaşkaloğlu, Near Zero Bitcoin Transaction Fees Cannot Last Forever, 
INT’L CONF. ON DIGITAL SECURITY & FORENSICS 91, 91–93 (June 2014), http://sdiwc.us/
digitlib/request.php?article=96cd6f6067fcbaf5e3947d071aa688fb [https://perma.cc/HAE4-CY
U2] (arguing that zero or infinitesimal transaction fees will not be sustainable, given 
characteristics of mining, securing the network from dishonest users, and the scarce supply). 
 75. See infra notes 240–44 and accompanying text. 
 76. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 31, at 8 (concluding that the proposed system for 
electronic transactions works without relying on trust because it uses a public history of 
transactions, which makes it impractical for them to be changed later on). 
 77. Id. at 1. 
 78. “Show me the money,” an in-person seller could say. 
 79. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 80. I use the term “technology of money” to refer to the idea that money, in whatever the 
currently accepted form may be, represents a particular society’s “practical . . . use of scientific 
and mathematical discoveries.” See Technology, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 81. And neither are unregulated currencies. See generally DAVIES, supra note 40 (tracing 
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For any technology—be it gold, banknotes, or bitcoin—to be 
accepted as a monetary standard, it must perform three important 
functions especially well: it must be (1) a medium of exchange,82 (2) a 
store of value,83 and (3) a unit of account84 (collectively the functions 
of money). When a new standard comes along that performs the 
functions of money better than the incumbents, a platform shift 
occurs, and the old standard is replaced.85 
Once upon a time, commodities—shells, grain, and metals—
operated as primitive monetary technologies.86 Among these early 
prototypes, gold reigned supreme because, of all the naturally 
occurring elements, its physical properties made it most suitable to 
perform the functions of money.87 Despite its first-mover advantage of 
more than 4000 years,88 gold was eventually disrupted by the next 
 
the development of money and currencies). 
 82. See id. at 13–18 (explaining that in the barter system, goods could not as easily be 
bought and sold because of valuation and exchange-rate problems). A good monetary platform 
provides users with liquidity and trade efficiency. In other words, it eliminates the problems that 
make a pure barter system inefficient. For example, say you have three chickens; all I have is a 
cow. I need one dozen eggs—a task for which my cow is obviously unfit. If my cow cannot 
produce anything you need, we are out of a deal. This problem is called the “double coincidence 
of wants.” Id. at 15. Second, even if you decide you could use some milk, we are faced with the 
problems of valuation and exchange rate. Id. What is my cow’s milk worth as to your chickens’ 
eggs? 
 83. A good monetary platform provides users with wealth stability—safety, storage, and 
retrieval features, for example. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 643 
(5th ed. 2008).  
 84. A good monetary platform provides users with a standardized unit of measurement, 
meaning users can track the value of economic items such as assets, liabilities, income, and 
expenses. Id.  
 85. See generally George Selgin, Adaptive Learning and the Transition to Fiat Money, 113 
ECON. J. 147, 162 (2003) (examining how the exchange medium effects influenced the 
development of money and when and how the transition from a barter to a money system 
occurs). 
 86. See DAVIES, supra note 40, at 35–45 (tracing the evolution of commodities used as 
primitive money). 
 87. It is dense, meaning a lot of value can be held in a little space; it is light enough to 
transport with relative ease; it does not corrode or decay; it is easily divisible into smaller pieces; 
and it is very hard to counterfeit. Why Gold?, NPR: PLANET MONEY (Nov. 16, 2010), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/02/07/131363098/the-tuesday-podcast-why-gold [http://perma.cc/
A9QG-49C7].  
 88. Many historians claim the first coins containing gold were struck in Lydia, Asia Minor 
(modern-day Turkey), around 600 B.C. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 40, at 61–65 (recounting 
the development of the first bimetallic coinage in Lydia); see also generally Robert A. Mundell, 
The Birth of Coinage (Columbia Univ. Dept. of Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 0102-
08, Feb. 2002) (tracing the development of coinage in the first millennium B.C. in Asia Minor 
and examining the evidence that they were invented in Lydia). 
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innovation in monetary technology, government-backed banknotes.89 
Though still a physical technology, banknotes offered streamlined 
features: portability, divisibility, storability, and fungibility.90 Soon 
after, another fundamental shift—this time digital—in monetary 
technology occurred: electronic deposits and transfers.91 
1. Bitcoin’s Downside: Blockchain-Based Currencies are a Poor 
Store of Value.  Gold and paper money have worked as monetary 
platforms because these technologies perform the functions of money 
especially well. Gold worked as a store of value due to its physical 
characteristics.92 The move away from gold was brought on by the 
realization that commodity money ties a country’s economy to a 
scarce natural resource, and this can have destabilizing effects.93 In 
other words, when Mother Nature controls the supply, shocks can 
occur that are beyond control.94 By contrast, fiat currency’s supply—
and thus its value—is protected by regulation.95 It is the only platform 
 
 89. In 1870, the Supreme Court struck down the Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345, the 
first legislation aimed at creating paper money under Article I of the Constitution. Hepburn v. 
Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 624 (1870). The very next year, a new Court overturned this 
decision, reasoning that the Civil War was a crisis that necessitated Congress’s power to declare 
paper money to be legal tender and that it was not forbidden by the Constitution. Knox v. Lee 
(Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 540–47 (1871) (“Whatever power there is over the 
currency is vested in Congress. If the power to declare what is money is not in Congress, it is 
annihilated.”). Finally, the Court extended Knox to uphold the validity of legal-tender laws 
during peacetime in Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884). Indeed, one court has gone 
so far as to declare, “Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution clearly gives the 
United States Congress the power to make anything it wishes legal tender.” Lowry v. State, 655 
P.2d 780, 782 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added). For an extended discussion, see 
generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1774–1970 (1973). 
 90. See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE 30–31 
(1875) (explaining the ideal properties in choosing the material of money, in particular 
portability and divisibility); SWANSON, supra note 37, at 12–13 (describing the differences in 
storability and portability, among other factors, between gold, banknotes, and bitcoin). 
 91. See DAVIES, supra note 40, at 649 (arguing that this innovation is second only to the 
printing of paper money in the history of monetary technology). 
 92. See supra note 87. 
 93. EDWARD B. BARBIER, SCARCITY AND FRONTIERS 238 (2011).  
 94. See id. The Panic of 1857, for example, was triggered when a hurricane off the coast of 
the Carolinas sunk the S.S. Central America, a vessel carrying thirty thousand pounds of gold. 
This sum represented the money supply of many East Coast banks. William J. Broad, X Still 
Marks the Sunken Spot, and Gold Awaits, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at A1. 
 95. See DONALD R. WELLS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: A HISTORY 19–20 (2004). 
Fiat systems rest on the generally accepted premise that a country’s citizens are better off when 
their federal government controls the money supply. Id. at 195. 
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recognized as legal tender,96 the government is obliged to accept it for 
tax payment,97 the central bank has monopoly control over supply,98 
and it is often backed by indirect collateral99 and insurance.100 These 
characteristics allow greater price stability.101 For example, the 
Federal Reserve can adjust supply to navigate macroeconomic and 
financial policy issues.102 
On the issue of value, a blockchain-based currency such as 
bitcoin is an imperfect substitute for fiat currency in much the same 
way gold is. The mathematic rules governing the bitcoin mining 
process103 are designed to mimic gold.104 So just as the laws of nature 
govern the gold supply, the laws of math govern the bitcoin supply.105 
In both cases, supply cannot be adjusted “to deal with recessions or to 
counteract destabilizing periods of inflation or deflation.”106 This 
might explain why the market has experienced wild price volatility.107 
 
 96. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012) (“United States coins and currency . . . are legal tender for 
all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for 
debts.”).  
 97. Id. 
 98. See 12 U.S.C. § 411 (2012) (directing that Federal Reserve Notes are to be issued at the 
discretion of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 99. See 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(b) (2012) (clarifying that acceptable collateral may be direct 
obligations or other obligations guaranteed by the United States as to principal and interest). 
 100. U.S. bank accounts are often insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). See 12 C.F.R. § 330.3 (2012) (explaining the general principles of the insurance 
coverage). 
 101. See WELLS, supra note 95, at 127, 190, 195. The Federal Reserve does this through a 
combination of lowering and stabilizing inflation, limiting fluctuation in the business cycle, and 
standing as a lender of last resort during periods of turmoil. Id. 
 102. See id. at 150 (discussing various normative perspectives on the Federal Reserve’s 
proper role in setting monetary policy).  
 103. See supra notes 56–77 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 105. See id. This rule has one important caveat. Although initial distribution is fixed, its 
parameters can be altered through a majoritarian process. An Interview with Eric Posner, in 21 
GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH 4, 5 (2014). Commentators find this unsettling 
because it means “technology and programming experts” wield control over a money supply, 
rather than “economists or monetary experts.” E.g., id. At least one commentator has explored 
the possibility of managing the money supply to create a stable blockchain-based currency 
without the need for intermediation at all. See Cameron Harwick, Cryptocurrency and the 
Problem of Intermediation 12–15 (May 31, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2612727_code2326669.pdf?abstractid=2523771&mirid=1 
[http://perma.cc/XZ9V-E72D]. However, since these parameters are fixed at the outset and 
bitcoin is very widely held, problems of coordination and collective action make it highly 
unlikely, as a practical matter, that any of the initial parameters will ever be altered.  
 106. David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger 
Currency Platforms 7 (Coase-Sandor Institute Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 685, 
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Figure 1. Bitcoin Volatility Time Series from Aug. 16, 2010 to Oct. 20,  
2015.108 
 
 
Over its history, bitcoin’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has 
frequently jumped or crashed over 20 percent (sometimes nearly 50 
percent) in the course of a single day.109 By contrast, over the same 
period, the U.S. dollar-to-euro exchange rate has never changed more 
than 2.5 percent in one day.110 Even a casual observer can recognize 
that such instability is not a desirable currency trait because its 
 
2014), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/685-dse-economic.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NET-EY
EB].  
 107. See infra Figure 1. Liquidity and pricing issues also exist. Bitcoin is a relatively illiquid 
asset. See Illiquid asset, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining illiquid asset as 
“[a]n asset that is not readily convertible into cash, usu. because of (1) the lack of demand, (2) 
the absence of an established market, or (3) the substantial cost or time required for 
liquidation” (alteration in original)). Accordingly, relatively small trades can move these thin 
markets. 2 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY: THE APPLIED THEORY OF 
MONEY 67 (1930). And prices are different across different exchanges, indicating that some 
markets carry a liquidity premium—for example, ones that allow users to more readily convert 
their holdings to fiat. All bitcoin-to-fiat trades are liquidity trades because the asset lacks 
underlying fundamentals. To attract business, payment processors such as BitPay must 
guarantee the price for a period of time so businesses may accept bitcoin payments without the 
corresponding price risk. See Bitcoin Exchange Rates, BITPAY, https://bitpay.com/bitcoin-
exchange-rates [https://perma.cc/4EUZ-YJH3] (listing the exchange rates). 
 108. THE BITCOIN VOLATILITY INDEX, https://btcvol.info [http://perma.cc/XTF5-4B3G]. 
Volatility in this figure is represented by the standard deviation of daily returns for the 
preceding thirty-day window over the past five years. Id. 
 109. Harwick, supra note 105, at 6. 
 110. Id. 
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holder’s purchasing power can increase or decrease drastically and 
suddenly.111 
2. Bitcoin’s Upside: A More Efficient Medium of Exchange.  
Though the technology fails as a store of value for reasons described 
above, the blockchain could play an integral role in the next phase of 
the financial-technology (fintech) revolution. Given its features, it is a 
technology uniquely capable of performing several key components 
of a transaction—recordkeeping, auditing, monitoring, enforcement, 
or asset custody (that is, escrow)—in addition to facilitating the trade 
itself. This is important because the global movement of value can be 
quite cumbersome.112 
For example, gold and fiat currency have always had high 
transportation costs, involving security, armored cars, and 
insurance.113 In fact, the simple laws of physics limited the Federal 
Reserve’s original structure; the number and locations of the Reserve 
Banks are such that “no bank [was] more than an overnight’s train 
ride from its [Federal Reserve].”114 These restraints were shattered by 
the first wave of the digital revolution, in which electronic transfers 
greatly reduced the cost of moving value.115 
Yet the movement of value along these electronic systems is still 
costly. First, moving value—actually clearing and settling a 
transaction—takes time. For example, on January 26, 2015, the 
Federal Reserve issued a call to action for all stakeholders in the U.S. 
 
 111. For an extended discussion of bitcoin’s volatility problem, see generally Mitsuru 
Iwamura, Yukinobu Kitamura, Tsutomu Matsumoto & Kenji Saito, Can We Stabilize the Price 
of a Cryptocurrency?: Understanding the Design of Bitcoin and Its Potential to Compete with 
Central Bank Money (Hitotsubashi Univ. Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper Series A 
No. 617, 2014) (suggesting an amendment to the Bitcoin protocol to set monetary policy without 
a central bank). 
 112. See DAVIES, supra note 40, at 596–602 (describing the “poverty trap” faced by many 
countries, despite the rapid increase of wealth in many others). 
 113. See id. at 606 (describing, for example, the prohibitive costs of transporting silver in 
rural Africa). 
 114. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: CURRENT AND 
FUTURE CHALLENGES REQUIRE SYSTEMWIDE ATTENTION 83 (1996). 
 115. As early as 1984, banks recognized that “[i]nformation about money” is “almost as 
important as money itself.” Thomas A. Bass, The Future of Money, WIRED (Oct. 1996), http://
archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.10/wriston_pr.html [http://perma.cc/98R4-L9RQ]. Today, 
“[d]igitization is challenging the very way banks operate.” Somesh Khanna, The Bank of the 
Future, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/financial_services/
the_bank_of_the_future [http://perma.cc/U8ST-J8XH]. 
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payments system116 to increase end-to-end payment speed, among 
other things.117 Currently, the Automated Clearing House118 (ACH) 
system supports more than 20 percent of all electronic payments in 
the United States—these transactions, to a great extent, relate to 
consumer and small-business transactions.119 More than $40 trillion 
moves through the ACH network each year in nearly 23 billion 
electronic transactions.120 Nearly all consumer transactions on the 
ACH network take two to three days.121 Second, moving money takes 
money. For example, an estimated $600 billion in principal will be 
sent in the remittance122 market in 2015.123 Companies like Western 
Union and MoneyGram traditionally provide this service and enjoy 
an average fee (or “take rate”) of 6 percent, though this rate can run 
as high as 9 percent.124 This translates to roughly $36 billion in fees in 
2015. 
 
 116. See FED. RESERVE SYS., STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM 
6–7 (2015), https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-
payment-system.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL6W-PR4S] (calling all stakeholders to seize the 
opportunity of the current critical juncture and improve the U.S. payment system). 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. Created in 1974, ACH is an electronic network of U.S. financial institutions. It was 
designed to reduce the need for paper checks in making “routine payments.” Automated 
Clearing Houses (ACHs), FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/
fedpoint/fed31.html [http://perma.cc/66MX-K3CK].  
 119. History and Network Statistics, NACHA—THE ELEC. PAYMENTS ASSOC., https://www.
nacha.org/ach-network/timeline [https://perma.cc/5T2B-7KPE]. The other major electronic-
value transfer systems, Fedwire and CHIPS—sometimes called “large-value payment 
systems”—are primarily used by financial institutions to settle large financial-market and other 
transactions. See COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the United States, in 2 PAYMENT, CLEARING AND 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE CPSS COUNTRIES 471, 487 (2012).  
 120. NACHA—THE ELEC. PAYMENTS ASSOC., ACH VOLUME INCREASES 5.3 PERCENT IN 
1ST QUARTER 2015, at 1, https://www.nacha.org/system/files/resources/1st%20Quarter%202015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5533-CRZM].  
 121. Although transactions can technically clear overnight on the ACH network, they are 
generally subject to batch processing, a process whereby a large volume of transactions is 
aggregated for simultaneous movement through the network. 
 122. Remittances are money transfers by (typically foreign) workers to other individuals 
(typically relatives in their home country). See Remittance, WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY 1630 (2d ed. 2014) (defining the term as “money or its equivalent sent from one 
place to another”). 
 123. Mark Scott, Remittances at the Click of a Smartphone Button, N.Y. TIMES: BITS 
(June 7, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/remittances-at-the-click-of-a-
smartphone-button [http://perma.cc/V6PG-2AZN] (citing a study by the World Bank).  
 124. DILIP RATHA ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT BRIEF 
23, at 12 (2014), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf [http://perma.cc/RS2L-58AM]. 
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Blockchain technology is uniquely positioned to tackle the 
problems of both speed and cost. For example, Coinbase, a 
prominent bitcoin company, provides a service called Instant 
Exchange.125 This service facilitates instantaneous cross-border money 
transfers with bitcoin as the intermediary for a total transaction cost 
of 2 percent.126 As applied to the $600 billion principal figure above 
(today’s remittance market), a potential cost savings of $24 billion 
might pass through directly to the consumers of such a service.127 
For these reasons (and many more that are beyond the scope of 
this Note), the financial-services sector is in the midst of a digital 
revolution.128 Of the $23.5 billion invested in fintech ventures between 
2013 and 2014, 23 percent ($5.4 billion) was invested in payments 
technology.129 As illustrated above, one critical aspect of payments 
technology is infrastructure. Payments-infrastructure initiatives are 
emerging in many countries across the world, driven by both public 
and private actors.130 Many players—from bootstrapping startups to 
large, incumbent financial institutions—believe blockchain 
technology will play an integral role.131 
In sum, blockchain technology solves an important problem in 
electronic value transfers. The blockchain does not only move value; 
it also integrates several components of the trading-clearing-
settlement value chain in an elegant, efficient, and mathematical way. 
 
 125. Instant Exchange, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/instant-exchange [http://
perma.cc/D9DE-TFB6]. 
 126. What is Instant Exchange?, COINBASE, https://support.coinbase.com/customer/
portal/articles/2021569-what-is-instant-exchange [http://perma.cc/Z8TK-8RAR] (noting that 
Coinbase’s standard 1 percent fee is applied on both sides of the transaction). 
 127. This amount is calculated as follows: First, solve for the difference between the average 
prevailing rate (that is, 6 percent) and Coinbase’s low-cost position (that is, 2 percent) to arrive 
at 4 percent. Second, solve for 4 percent of the $600 billion principal figure. The amount is $24 
billion. 
 128. See ACCENTURE, THE FUTURE OF FINTECH AND BANKING: DIGITALLY DISRUPTED 
OR REIMAGINED? 3 (2015), https://www.accenture.com/t20150707T195228__w__/lven/_acn
media/Accenture/Conversion-Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Dualpub_11/Accenture-
Future-Fintech-Banking.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QL2-567B] (reporting a 201 percent increase in 
fintech investments from 2013 to 2014); see also MARIANO BELINKY, EMMET RENNICK & 
ANDREW VEITCH, THE FINTECH 2.0 PAPER: REBOOTING FINANCIAL SERVICES (2015), 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2015/jun/The_Fintech_2_0_
Paper_Final_PV.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LMK-XQ4U] (discussing the significant changes in the 
policy and technology surrounding fintech). 
 129. BELINKY ET AL., supra note 128, at 4. 
 130. See Rob Hayden, Transforming National Payments Systems, 20 MCKINSEY ON 
PAYMENTS 23, 24 (Sept. 2014).  
 131. For articles on bank innovation around blockchain technology, see supra note 4. 
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To be sure, these facts neither imply nor foreclose on the desirability 
of a blockchain-based currency. They simply indicate that blockchain 
technology should be of interest to any industry engaged in the digital 
transfer of value. For example, instead of being used as an alternative 
currency, it might facilitate the transfer of traditional units of value—
U.S. dollars or euros for example. In other words, incumbent firms in 
the payments-and-transfer space can co-opt it to gain efficiencies 
systems, lower fee structures, and provide more competitive 
services.132 
II.  THE DEVELOPING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BLOCKCHAIN 
TRANSACTIONS 
Part I explained how money has evolved over time, both as a 
technology and as a concept. Specifically, it has shifted from a store of 
value in itself to a medium of exchange. As the role of cash 
diminishes in favor of electronic deposits and transfers,133 many 
wonder about the extent to which blockchain-based currencies will 
influence the next phase of this global payment revolution. Indeed, 
entrepreneurial ventures—some backed by considerable human and 
financial resources—are building a vibrant ecosystem of 
complementary products and services around this vision.134 One view, 
hailing the virtues of a free, open currency market is that transactions 
in this space should be entirely deregulated.135 This Part concludes at 
 
 132. One prominent example in this space is Ripple, a company that has designed a protocol 
similar to Bitcoin for routing payments and settling funds. Designed to simplify interbank 
payments at the infrastructure level, Ripple has end users in the financial industry, including 
banks, governments, and clearinghouses. RIPPLE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 2 (2015), https://ripple.com/files/ripple_executive_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W83S-8XSF]. For a note on the technical distinction between Bitcoin and Ripple, see infra note 
170. For a discussion on Ripple’s recent settlement agreement with FinCEN, see infra notes 
171–74 and accompanying text. 
 133. See DAVIES, supra note 40, at 649–52 (discussing the global move toward electronic 
transactions). 
 134. See Grinberg, supra note 27, at 165 (“A growing ecosystem surrounds Bitcoin, 
including exchanges, transaction services providers, market information and chart providers, 
escrow providers, joint mining operations and so on.”); see also Michael A. Cusumano, The 
Bitcoin Ecosystem, COMM. OF THE ACM, Oct. 2014, at 22, https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/
association-for-computing-machinery/the-bitcoin-ecosystem-fUAzCpWvpD [https://perma.cc/
PE6T-NV6W] (“[B]itcoins are a complex platform technology that requires the help of 
intermediaries—an ecosystem of ‘complementary’ product and service providers that charge 
fees.”).  
 135. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Comment, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital 
Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 171 (2012) 
(arguing that “bitcoins should be treated as an unregulated community currency under the 
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the outset without further discussion that such a view is neither 
realistic nor desirable, given a compelling policy interest in preventing 
abuse and misuse.136 Examples of such abuses include bitcoin’s 
potential to facilitate black-market transactions,137 tax evasion,138 
money laundering,139 and terrorist financing.140 
This Part explores the emerging legal framework around virtual 
currencies and serves as a practical guide for policymakers and 
innovators trying to both shape and navigate it. Both federal and state 
regulators have identified some basic risks around blockchain-based 
currencies and begun staking jurisdictional claims. Policymakers are 
currently revisiting complex, interwoven regulatory frameworks—
primarily banking laws, commodities laws, and securities laws—to 
shoehorn the technology into existing frameworks and consider 
where new ones might be appropriate. This Part presents a patchwork 
that is continuing to emerge,141 with special attention on areas posing 
uncertainty for innovators. 
A. Federal Regulation of Blockchain-Based Currencies 
No comprehensive federal regulation exists for virtual 
currencies. Many government bodies—specifically, FinCEN, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), SEC, CFTC, and Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—have offered guidance and 
taken limited action. This Section summarizes the most significant 
federal developments to date—FinCEN’s guidance, administrative 
rulings, and enforcement against Ripple Labs, Inc. (Ripple)142—and 
explains the likely implications for innovators. Finally, it notes the 
 
law”). 
 136. For a thoughtful discussion on normative and logistical issues in regulating Internet 
activity, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 (2d ed. 2006). 
 137. Ly, supra note 28, at 595 (discussing Silk Road). 
 138. Id. at 595–96. 
 139. Id. at 594. 
 140. See SWANSON, supra note 37, at 28 (mentioning terrorist financing and money 
laundering as two of the possible pitfalls of Bitcoin). 
 141. Given the fixed nature of print publication, readers should visit DAVIS POLK & 
WARDWELL LLP, supra note 39, for the latest developments on regulation of Bitcoin and other 
virtual currencies. 
 142. The IRS has also issued a notice declaring that virtual currencies should be treated as 
property for federal tax purposes. See IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency Is 
Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions 
Apply, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-
Virtual-Currency-Guidance [http://perma.cc/3F4A-KHLA]. For an extended discussion of the 
implications of this rule for the bitcoin economy, see Ly, supra note 28, at 606–08. 
KIVIAT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  6:37 AM 
590 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:569 
limited scenarios in which the other agencies have jurisdiction over 
blockchain activities. 
1. FinCEN Guidance, Rulings, and Enforcement.  Under the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),143 banks and other financial institutions are 
subject to various registration and recordkeeping requirements.144 All 
“money service businesses”145 are required to register with the 
Department of the Treasury146 and develop anti-money-laundering147 
and customer identification programs.148 In March 2013, FinCEN149 
extended these rules to cover certain participants who transact in 
“convertible virtual currencies.”150 It defined this term to include any 
medium of exchange that “operates like a currency in some 
environments,” and “has an equivalent value in [or acts as a substitute 
for] real currency,” but does not have “legal tender status in any 
jurisdiction.”151 
Under FinCEN’s guidance, “exchangers” and “administrators” 
are possibly subject to regulation.152 Exchangers are persons or 
businesses that exchange virtual currency for real currency, funds, or 
other virtual currency.153 Administrators are persons or businesses 
engaged in the business of “issuing (putting into circulation) a virtual 
currency” who also have “the authority to redeem (to withdraw from 
 
 143. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 
1951–59 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq.). 
 144. Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Reporting and the Crime 
of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 412–20 (2010) (providing an overview of the 
registration and record-keeping requirements for banks and other “money transmitters”). 
 145. The term “money services business” includes “money transmitters,” defined as a 
person that accepts and transmits currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency. 
31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2015). 
 146. Id. § 1022.380(a). 
 147. Id. § 1022.210(a). 
 148. Id. § 1022.210(i). 
 149. Established in 1990, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, is a 
bureau of the Department of the Treasury that combats domestic and international money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. What We Do, FinCEN, http://
www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/ [http://perma.cc/S72W-VBJE]. 
 150. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, 
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR 
USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (2013), http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XAF-PAFC] [hereinafter FINCEN GUIDANCE]. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2. 
 153. Id. 
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circulation) such virtual currency.”154 An exchanger or administrator 
becomes a “money transmitter” subject to these registration and 
recordkeeping requirements when they either “accept[] and 
transmit[]” convertible virtual currency or “buy[] or sell[]” 
convertible virtual currency.155 “Users” are explicitly carved out.156 
In 2014, FinCEN issued four rulings under this guidance157 that, 
together with existing BSA laws, provide some key insights. First, any 
blockchain transaction is likely a virtual-currency transaction, because 
even nonfinancial uses require a de minimis amount of currency (that 
is, a fraction of a penny of bitcoin). However, such activity must also 
be performed by an “exchanger” or “administrator” to trigger BSA 
requirements.158 End users, such as merchants or consumers, are likely 
to be exempted.159 
Second, a user who mines virtual currency (miner-user) is not a 
money transmitter, even if he uses the bitcoin to purchase goods and 
services.160 Further, miner-users converting virtual currencies to real 
or other virtual currencies are not subject to BSA requirements, so 
long as their conversion is for personal use.161 Therefore, miner-users 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 156. “Users” are persons who obtain virtual currency “to purchase goods and services.” Id. 
at 2. 
 157. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R001, 
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS 
(2014) [hereinafter FINCEN RULING 1], http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-
2014-R001.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4PL-F92L]; FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, FIN-2014-R002, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL 
CURRENCY SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND CERTAIN INVESTMENT ACTIVITY (2014) 
[hereinafter FINCEN RULING 2], http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-
R002.pdf [http://perma.cc/P8K4-WTQQ]; FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011, REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION 
OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (2014) 
[hereinafter FINCEN RULING 3], http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-
R011.pdf [http://perma.cc/HL78-LDHQ]; FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, FIN-2014-R012, REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION 
OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY PAYMENT SYSTEM (2014) [hereinafter 
FINCEN RULING 4], http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R012.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/NZA9-WLTR]. 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 152–55. 
 159. See FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 150, at 1 (“A user of virtual currency is not an 
MSB under FinCEN’s regulations and therefore is not subject to MSB registration, reporting, 
and recordkeeping regulations.”). 
 160. FINCEN RULING 1, supra note 157, at 3. 
 161. This conclusion is grounded in the “end user” exemption. See supra, note 159 and 
accompanying text. It is supported by FINCEN GUIDANCE. See supra note 157, at 3. (“What is 
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should not be seen as money transmitters subject to the BSA’s 
registration and recordkeeping requirements unless they are selling 
bitcoin as a business.162 
Third, a company that mines virtual currency (miner-company) is 
not a money transmitter in certain instances. Specifically, miner-
companies are not money transmitters when convertible virtual 
currency is used (1) to pay for goods or services, (2) to pay debts 
previously incurred, (3) to make distributions to owners, (4) to 
purchase real or other virtual currency specifically for any of the 
previous three purposes, or (5) for the company’s own investment 
account.163 
Fourth, a company is an “exchanger” regardless of whether it 
acts as a broker (by matching two simultaneous, offsetting 
transactions) or as a dealer (by transacting on its own account).164 At 
least three U.S.-based exchanges have shut down in the wake of this 
guidance.165  
Finally, two important exemptions (that predate both the 
guidance and the rulings) carve out certain activities from the 
definition of money transmitter: the “integral” exemption and the 
 
material to the conclusion . . . is not the mechanism by which person obtains the convertible 
virtual currency, but what the person uses the convertible virtual currency for, and for whose 
benefit.”). 
 162. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 150, at 2 & n.7. 
 163. FINCEN RULING 1, supra note 157, at 3; FINCEN RULING 2, supra note 157, at 4. 
 164. FINCEN RULING 3, supra note 157, at 3; FINCEN RULING 4, supra note 157, at 3. 
 165. Jon Matonis, Fincen’s New Regulations are Choking Bitcoin Entrepreneurs, AM. 
BANKER: THE MONETARY FUTURE (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/
bankthink/fincen-regulations-choking-bitcoin-entrepreneurs-1058606-1.html [http://perma.cc/
5ADR-M5FH]. The force of these regulations is compounded by the fact that, a few months 
after the FinCEN issued its guidance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
issued guidance effectively raising the cost for banks and other financial institutions for 
conducting business with any blockchain-based currency companies. OCC Bulletin 2013–29, 
Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management Guidance (Oct. 30, 2013). To be sure, the 
guidance does not specifically address bitcoin or blockchain-based currencies; however, it refers 
to certain third-party relationships that involve “critical activities” and merit enhanced risk 
measures. Id. Specifically, the guidance requires the adoption of “risk-based processes” for 
third-party relationships commensurate with the level of risk and complexity inherent in those 
relationships. Id. With bitcoin businesses considered high risk due to their potential for money 
laundering and other illicit uses, this guidance means banks will have to conduct enhanced due 
diligence on any blockchain-based company. Id. Accordingly, many U.S. companies and 
entrepreneurs have had trouble accessing basic banking services. See Kashmir Hill, Bitcoin 
Companies and Entrepreneurs Can’t Get Bank Accounts, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2013, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/11/15/bitcoin-companies-and-entrepreneurs-cant-
get-bank-accounts [http://perma.cc/CY76-ADVY] (reporting on the U.S.-based bitcoin 
exchanges that have shut down). 
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“payment processor” exemption. First, BSA legislation provides an 
exemption for entities that accept and transmit funds “only integral to 
the [entity’s] sale of goods or the provision of [other, nonmoney 
transmission] services.”166 In other words, ordinary merchants and 
service providers who merely accept bitcoin as a convenience to 
customers are not money transmitters. Second, BSA legislation 
provides an exemption for any entity acting as a “payment processor 
to facilitate the purchase of . . . a good or service through a clearance 
and settlement system by agreement with the creditor or seller.”167 
One condition necessary for this exemption is that the entities 
operate only through clearance and settlement systems that admit 
BSA-regulated financial institutions.168 Accordingly, bitcoin-based 
payment processors will have a difficult time availing themselves of 
this exception because the virtual-currency leg of the transaction will 
always settle on the blockchain169—a system that inherently allows 
participation by non-BSA-regulated members.170 
On May 5, 2015, in its first civil enforcement action against a 
virtual-currency business, FinCEN announced a $700,000 fine against 
 
 166. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) (2015). FinCEN has specified a three-prong test for 
this exemption: (1) the money-transmission component must be part of the provision of goods 
or services distinct from money transmission itself, (2) the exemption can only be claimed by the 
person that is engaged in the provision of goods or services distinct from money transmission, 
and (3) the money transmission component must be necessary for the provision of the goods 
and services. FINCEN RULING 3, supra note 157, at 4; FINCEN RULING 4, supra note 157, at 4. 
 167. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(B) (2015).  
 168. FinCEN has specified a four-prong test for this exemption: (1) the entity providing the 
service must facilitate the purchase of goods or services, or the payment of bills for goods or 
services (other than money transmission itself), (2) the entity must operate through clearance-
and-settlement systems that admit only financial institutions regulated under the BSA, (3) the 
entity must provide the service pursuant to a formal agreement, and (4) the entity’s agreement 
must be at a minimum with the seller or creditor that provided the goods or services and 
receives the funds. FINCEN RULING 3, supra note 157, at 4–5; FINCEN RULING 4, supra note 
157, at 4. 
 169. See supra Part I.A. 
 170. This exemption implicates an important distinction between “permissionless” networks 
(like Bitcoin) and “permissioned” networks (like Ripple). A permissionless network, such as the 
Bitcoin blockchain, is fully decentralized—in other words, participants may join the network, 
process transactions, and fully participate without any previous relationship with the ledger. See 
TIM SWANSON, CONSENSUS-AS-A-SERVICE: A BRIEF REPORT ON THE EMERGENCE OF 
PERMISSIONED, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SYSTEMS 5 (2015), http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf [http://perma.cc/A2GA-SUQH]. 
Such a network will never meet the “payment processor” exemption because non-BSA-
regulated entities cannot be screened out. By contrast, on permissioned networks, participants 
are whitelisted through some type of know-your-customer procedure. Id. Such a network may 
be designed to accommodate regulatory exemptions of this nature. 
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Ripple and a simultaneous settlement agreement.171 Ripple was selling 
XRP, a virtual currency similar to bitcoin, that it designed for the 
purpose of creating a real-time settlement infrastructure.172 In its 
negotiated settlement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern 
District of California, Ripple admitted to violating several BSA 
requirements in its “exchange” and “transmission” of XRP for fiat 
currency.173 Though Ripple had registered its subsidiary as a money-
services business in accordance with FinCEN’s guidance, it sold XRP 
for several months without a proper anti-money-laundering (AML) 
program in place, failed to designate a compliance officer, and did not 
solicit an independent review of its practices and procedures.174 
Two lessons can be learned from FinCEN’s enforcement against 
Ripple. First, FinCEN is clearly taking a hard stance, per its 2013 
guidance, that AML programs are a necessity from the very moment 
a business begins “exchang[ing]” or “transmi[tting]” customer 
funds.175 Second, distributed-ledger businesses that operate outside of 
the traditional Bitcoin blockchain will not escape FinCEN’s scrutiny. 
2. CFTC Jurisdiction over Bitcoin Derivatives and Market 
Manipulation Oversight.  As noted above,176 blockchain-based 
currencies share some economic properties with commodity money,177 
and legal definitions support their characterization as a commodity in 
some instances. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)178 broadly 
defines a “commodity” to include “all services, rights and interests . . . 
in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future 
 
 171. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FinCEN Fines 
Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency Exchanger (May 
5, 2015), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20150505.pdf [http://perma.cc/T6WU-55Z4]. 
 172. Does this sound familiar? See supra Part I.B.2.  
 173. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH RIPPLE LABS, INC., at app. A 
4–6 (May 5, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/file/421626/download [http://perma.cc/DPD5-P8Q9]. 
 174. Id. at app. A 5–6. 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 152–56 (discussing exchangers and transmitters). 
 176. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 177. Indeed, one monetary economist established the term “synthetic commodity money” to 
describe the unique economic properties of a blockchain-based currency, such as bitcoin. See 
George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money 7–8 (Apr. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000118 [http://perma.cc/G2GY-BSNH]. 
 178. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 
1389, 1395 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) (defining the term “commodity” and 
providing for CFTC jurisdiction over all options and futures trading in commodities); see also 
William L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (1988) (discussing the meaning of “commodity” under the CEA). 
KIVIAT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  6:37 AM 
2015] BEYOND BITCOIN 595 
dealt in.”179 Accordingly, the CFTC has jurisdiction over derivatives 
contracts180 related to interests not traditionally thought of as 
commodities—Treasury securities, stock-market indices, and 
currencies, for example. Under this analysis,181 the CFTC concluded 
that bitcoin and other virtual currencies are “properly defined as 
commodities.”182 And in September 2014, the agency oversaw the 
launch of the first bitcoin swap execution facility (SEF).183 
Bitcoin derivatives—for example, a swap contract pegged to the 
U.S.-dollar-bitcoin exchange rate—are exotic instruments at this 
stage.184 The more pressing question, then, is the extent to which the 
 
 179. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2015) (codifying CFTC Final Rule 
1.3(e)). 
 180. Derivatives contracts are agreements between two parties, the value of which is 
determined by the price of something else, such as a changing interest rate, financial index, or 
market price. See generally ROBERT L. MCDONALD, DERIVATIVES MARKETS 1 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“Derivatives [contracts] can be thought of as bets on the price of something.”). 
 181. More accurately, it was a legal conclusion lacking any analysis. It can only be assumed, 
however, that analysis was driving the conclusion, and this analysis would be a proper line of 
reasoning if the CFTC’s position is challenged. Indeed, CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad has 
used similar reasoning in contending that “[d]erivative contracts based on a virtual currency 
represent one area within [the CFTC’s] responsibility.” Testimony of Chairman Timothy 
Massad Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, U.S. 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-6 [http://perma.cc/9LNA-NQVM]. 
 182. Coinflip, Inc., Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions at 3, CFTC 
Docket No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcement
actions/documents/legalpleading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf [http://perma.cc/5B4W-PJ3G]. 
 183. See Press Release, TeraExchange, TeraExchange Launches First Regulated Bitcoin 
Derivatives Trading (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.teraexchange.com/news/2014_09_12_
Launches%20First%20Regulated%20Bitcoin%20Derivatives.pdf [http://perma.cc/B3DG-3A
CQ] (announcing the first regulated trading platform for bitcoin derivatives). An SEF is a type 
of regulated marketplace under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. Specifically, it is a platform for swap trading that provides pretrade 
information—a spot-market index, bids, and offers—and an execution mechanism for swap 
transactions. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(50) (2012) (defining “swap execution facility”). Swaps are 
agreements for parties to exchange cash flows over time, with one party paying the other based 
on the actual price in reference to the contractually specified price. MCDONALD, supra note 
180, at 247. The first recorded swap in this space involved the sale of a multimillion-dollar 
Stradivarius violin to a wealth-management company. The buyer wanted to use bitcoins in 
consideration for the purchase, but the seller was worried about exchange-rate risk over the 
period of the contract, given wild price fluctuations. TeraExchange worked with the buyer to 
structure a deal that would protect both parties from losses, and it became the prototype for this 
SEF. See Paul Vigna & Michael J. Casey, BitBeat: Bitcoin, Stradivarius Make Beautiful Music 
Together, WALL ST. J.: MONEY BEAT (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2014/03/28/bitbeat-bitcoin-stradivarius-make-beautiful-music-together [http://perma.cc/A728-
RC4D]. 
 184. Currently, payment processors assume the exchange-rate risk from merchants. For 
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CFTC can exercise jurisdiction over spot-market transactions185 under 
its anti-manipulation authority.186 In other words, the CFTC has 
enforcement authority over spot transactions in certain instances 
because spot-market manipulation can affect derivatives market 
prices.187 Thus, in certain cases the CFTC may regulate bitcoin 
pursuant to its anti-manipulation rules.188 While manipulation 
oversight would bring some regulation to the spot market, one issue is 
whether manipulation oversight alone is sufficient, even under the 
broad anti-manipulation rules of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).189 
Dodd-Frank extended the CEA’s anti-manipulation rules to 
cover swaps and clarified that “manipulation” under the CEA 
includes not only “actual manipulation”190 but also an intent-based 
“attempted manipulation.”191 This new authority was first exercised in 
 
example, merchants typically utilize a payment-processing service, such as BitPay, to convert 
bitcoin-denominated payments to fiat currency almost immediately. See Getting Started: 
Accepting Bitcoin Payment, BITPAY, https://bitpay.com/docs [https://perma.cc/KHB2-UY6X]. 
One way payment processors may consider hedging this risk would be through derivatives.  
 185. A “spot transaction” is simply the current sale or purchase for immediate settlement. 
Spot transaction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 186. The CEA makes it a felony “to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of . . . 
any commodity.” 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). The CEA also creates a private right of action to 
accompany the government’s civil and criminal enforcement capabilities. Id. § 22(a); see also 
id. § 25(a)(1) (“Any person . . . who violates this chapter or who willfully aids . . . a violation of 
this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting from . . . such violation.”). The exact 
meaning of “manipulation” has been debated, as is not statutorily defined. Broadly stated, 
manipulation is an intentional exaction of a price determined by forces other than supply and 
demand. 
 187. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The 
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. REG. 281, 283 (1991) (describing “market power 
manipulation”); see also JOSEPH M. BURNS, A TREATISE ON MARKETS: SPOTS, FUTURES, AND 
OPTIONS 93–94 (1979) (describing the CFTC’s “preventive and punitive approaches for dealing 
with temporary monopolies”).  
 188. See 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012) (“In addition to the prohibition in paragraph (1), it shall be 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price 
of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to 
the rules of any registered entity.”). 
 189. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. VII, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 (2010). Section 753 of Dodd-Frank amends section 6(c) of the CEA 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15 (2012)). 
 190. Before Dodd-Frank, “manipulation” generally required “actual manipulation,” proven 
by a well-established four-prong test: (1) the ability to influence market prices, (2) the intent to 
create or affect prices not reflecting legitimate forces of supply and demand, (3) the existence of 
artificial prices, and (4) the accused caused such artificial prices. 2 THOMAS A. RUSSO, 
REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURE AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 12.11 (1983). 
 191. 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to 
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CFTC v. Atlantic Bullion & Coin, Inc.192 In Atlantic Bullion, the CFTC 
brought a civil action against the coordinators of a Ponzi scheme 
involving spot-market silver contracts.193 Over an eleven-year period, 
the defendants fraudulently sold silver contracts in a nationwide 
scheme.194 The defendants never supplied any silver; instead, they 
misappropriated all the funds and issued false account statements.195 
Under a similar analysis, the CFTC could bring investor-protection 
measures to the spot market for blockchain-based currencies and 
derivative products.196 
B. State Regulation of Blockchain-based Currencies 
On June 3, 2015, New York’s Department of Financial Services 
issued its final “BitLicense” framework for regulating “virtual 
currency businesses.”197 Over a period of almost one year, BitLicense 
went from its initial proposal198 to reproposal199 to final rule. The 
process gave rise to two comment periods that elicited thousands of 
letters200 expressing a wide range of opinions. And although it is too 
 
manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any swap, or of any commodity.”). The CFTC 
implemented this provision in Final Rule 180.2. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012). 
 192. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Atl. Bullion & Coin, Inc., [2012–2013 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,551 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012).  
 193. Complaint at 1, Alt. Bullion & Coin, Inc., No. 8:12-cv-01503-JMC. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 2. 
 196. Similarly, investors have at least some protection under U.S. securities laws, to the 
extent they are dealing in interests in bitcoin-related investment vehicles. See SEC v. Shavers, 
No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (finding an interest in a 
bitcoin-based Ponzi scheme to be an “investment contract” for purposes of U.S. securities laws 
and imposing civil monetary penalties under the Securities Act). For an extended analysis of 
market manipulation at the infamous and ill-fated Mt. Gox exchange, see The Willy Report: 
Proof of Massive Fraudulent Trading Activity at Mt. Gox, and How it has Affected the Price 
of Bitcoin, THE WILLY REP. (May 25, 2014), https://willyreport.wordpress.com/2014/05/25/the-
willy-report-proof-of-massive-fraudulent-trading-activity-at-mt-gox-and-how-it-has-affected-
the-price-of-bitcoin [http://perma.cc/N59G-BSMC]. 
 197. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2015). 
 198. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Regulation of the 
Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 36 N.Y. Reg. 14 (July 23, 2014) [hereinafter BitLicense 
Proposal]. The full text of the BitLicense Proposal is available from the NYDFS’s website at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf [http://perma.cc/38SU-8XDB]. 
 199. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Regulation of the 
Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 37 N.Y. Reg. 8 (Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter BitLicense 
Reproposal]. The full text of the BitLicense Reproposal is available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
legal/regulations/revised_vc_regulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/VR2p-KCCU]. 
 200. Nearly 4,000 comments were received over the course of this eleven-month period. See 
Comments Regarding the Proposed Virtual Currency Regulatory Framework, N.Y. DEP’T OF 
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early to draw any empirical conclusions on BitLicense’s long-term 
market impact,201 it has certainly raised the cost of entry for certain 
participants and will likely pave a smoother path to integration with 
the established banking system.  
New York’s regime covers most business activities202 involving 
(1) “virtual currencies,” defined to include decentralized blockchain-
based currencies,203 and (2) New York or New York customers.204 
Much of the uncertainty around BitLicense lurks in its protracted 
definition of “virtual currency business activities,” which breaks down 
into five major prongs: (1) transmitting virtual currency; (2) holding 
virtual currency on behalf of others; (3) buying and selling virtual 
currency as a customer business; (4) providing exchange services as a 
customer business; and (5) controlling, administering, or issuing 
virtual currency.205 
First, the “transmission” prong presents some uncertainty in the 
statutory language itself. For example, the definition includes “the 
transfer, by or through a third party, of Virtual Currency from a 
Person to a Person.”206 Imagine a business that simply transfers virtual 
 
FIN. SERVS., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/vcrf_comments.htm [http://perma.cc/J7H3-KANH] 
(collecting comments). 
 201. The application deadline passed only four months prior to this Note’s publication. See 
BitLicense Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/
regulations/bitlicense_reg_framework_faq.htm [http://perma.cc/972V-5Q3A] (“[A]pplicants 
must apply by August 10, 2015.”).  
 202. Exemptions are provided for approved exchange service providers chartered under 
New York Banking Law and mere merchant/consumer activities. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 23, § 200.03(c) (2015). 
 203. Id. § 200.02(m). This includes:  
Any type of digital unit used as a medium of exchange or form of digitally stored 
value [and is] broadly construed to include digital units of exchange that (i) have a 
centralized repository or administrator; (ii) are decentralized and have no centralized 
repository or administrator; or (iii) may be created or obtained by computing or 
manufacturing effort. 
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, NEW YORK’S FINAL “BITLICENSE” RULE: OVERVIEW AND 
CHANGES FROM JULY 2014 PROPOSAL 9 (2015), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/
2015-06-05_New_Yorks_Final_BitLicense_Rule.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5KG-C9ZJ]. It does not 
include digital units that are used (i) solely within online-gaming platforms, such as Nintendo 
Wii Points; (ii) in connection with a customer-affinity or rewards program, such as Delta 
SkyMiles; or (iii) used as part of fiat prepaid cards. Id. 
 204. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.02(n) (2015). The extent of New York 
jurisdiction is very broad. It likely includes businesses that serve or solicit New York customers 
through web-based services when such businesses do not take adequate precautions to exclude 
such customers. However, because no prohibition precludes dividend distributions, businesses 
may choose to limit New York–facing activity to limited-purpose subsidiaries. 
 205. Id. § 200.02(q)(1)–(5). 
 206. Id. § 200.02(o). 
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currency internally between proprietary accounts. In such a case, the 
transmission prong rightly is not triggered because the business does 
not interact with any third parties. However, what if that same 
business also transfers virtual currency to third parties, but not for 
goods or services—for example, to pay dividend distributions or 
salaries? The statutory language does not resolve whether the 
business, by virtue of that fact alone, must carry a BitLicense. 
Another wrinkle in the “transmission” prong is the explicit 
exception for transactions “undertaken for non-financial purposes” 
that do not involve “more than a nominal amount” of virtual 
currency.207 “Non-financial” is not a statutorily defined term. 
Blockchain technology can be used in a number of ways that are 
clearly “non-financial”—for example, to facilitate identity 
verification,208 digital-document verification,209 or peer-to-peer 
transfers of digital assets.210 In other cases, however, it is less clear 
whether this exception applies. For example, how would a smart 
contract211 transferring a right to payment from financial assets using a 
nominal amount of virtual currency be treated? 
Second, the “holding” prong presents uncertainty with respect to 
its scope. Though the draft language includes the word “securing,” 
that word is absent from the final rule.212 “Securing” virtual currency 
likely refers to multi-signature (“multi-sig”) transactions. Multi-sig 
transactions involve more than two parties.213 For example, a two-of-
three multi-sig transaction is a transaction between three parties that 
requires the approval of two parties prior to settlement.214 One 
implication of this feature is cryptographic escrow. For example, 
 
 207. Importantly, based on the structure of the rule itself, this is an exception from the 
“transmission” prong, not from the entire rule. See id. § 200.02(q)(1) (exempting this transaction 
from the definition of transmission). 
 208. See, e.g., ONENAME, https://onename.com [https://perma.cc/9YZV-G5NK] (allowing 
users to sign their blockchain transactions with a verifiable personal identity). 
 209. See, e.g., BLOCK NOTARY, http://www.blocknotary.com [http://perma.cc/KD26-F2F2] 
(allowing users to securely and digitally sign documents via blockchain transactions, performing 
a notary-like function). 
 210. For more examples of potential innovative applications of blockchain technology, see 
infra Part III. 
 211. For a discussion of smart contracts, see infra Part III.B. 
 212. Compare BitLicense Proposal, supra note 198, § 200.2(n)(2) (defining “Virtual 
Currency Business Activity” to include “securing . . . Virtual Currency on behalf of others), with 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(q) (2015) (omitting the word “securing”). 
 213. ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 129 (2014).  
 214. Id. at 129–30. 
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Party A and Party B enter a contract with payment provisions 
contingent on an objectively verifiable event. They enlist Party M as a 
mediator who will sign the transaction in favor of the appropriate 
party upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of such event. Removing 
Party M from the scope of this prong is probably appropriate because 
Party M never actually takes custody of the assets. 
Third, the “buying and selling” prong presents uncertainty in the 
statutory language. Specifically, this prong is triggered by the buying 
and selling of virtual currency “as a customer business”215—a phrase 
that, read broadly, could likely encompass a wide range of activity. 
The best way to view this prong seems to be that it refers to buying 
virtual currency from customers and selling virtual currency to 
customers on a principal or agency basis. Under this interpretation, 
sales of virtual currency to third parties that are not part of the 
customer-facing business should fall beyond the provision’s scope. 
Both the fourth and fifth prongs (that is, the “exchange services” 
and “controlling or administering” prongs) overlap with FinCEN’s 
definitions of “exchangers” and “administrators” under FinCEN’s 
2013 guidance.216 Likewise, the same analysis that applies under 
FinCEN’s 2013 guidance would apply to covered activities under both 
prongs.217 Miners and creators of decentralized virtual currencies 
likely would be excluded under the same reasoning, assuming their 
activities extend no further.218 
Lastly, two exemptions are worth noting.219 First, the 
“merchant/consumer” exemption is fairly straightforward. Like 
FinCEN’s 2013 guidance,220 it carves out merchants or consumers who 
use virtual currency solely for purchasing or selling goods or services, 
or solely for investment purposes. Second, a more ambiguous 
“software developer” exemption applies to individuals and businesses 
that engage solely in the development and dissemination of 
 
 215. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(q)(3) (2015). 
 216. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
 218. Id. 
 219. The “non-financial purposes” exception to the “transmission” prong would not be 
considered an exemption here because it only operates as an exclusion to that specific element 
of “virtual currency business activity.” See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(q)(1) 
(2015) (excluding non-financial purposes from this definition). In other words, a business may 
satisfy the “non-financial purposes” exception yet still be subject to the rule by means of one of 
the other four prongs. 
 220. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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software.221 NYDFS has consistently asserted that it is regulating 
financial intermediaries, not software developers.222 However, the line 
between the two may not always be clear. 
Consider a business that develops wallet software—mobile 
applications that allow users to view and manage their virtual-
currency balance.223 On one hand, the developer does not take 
custody of the user’s virtual currency at any point, and it does not 
transmit or exchange virtual currency.224 Instead, it simply provides 
the user with a blockchain access point. On the other hand, the 
software stores the user’s private key—the secret mathematical code 
necessary for the user to access his holdings on the blockchain. This 
weighs against the exemption’s application, because access to a user’s 
private key is the functional equivalent of access to the user’s 
holdings tied to that key. Accordingly, a security compromise in the 
wallet software could cause users to lose all or part of their virtual-
currency holdings.225 
In light of the prior analysis, it seems fair to say that the law will 
have at least two short-term consequences. First, it will raise the cost 
of entry for market participants by mandating various programs—
cybersecurity,226 consumer protection,227 financial reporting,228 and 
AML.229 Indeed, many businesses have already chosen to exit New 
 
 221. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.02(q) (2015). 
 222. See, e.g., NYDFS Announces Final Bitlicense Framework for Regulating Digital 
Currency Firms, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (June 3, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/
speeches/sp1506031.htm [http://perma.cc/9Y8C-3BYS] (“[W]e have no intention of being a 
regulator of software developers—only financial intermediaries.”). 
 223. See Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear: Wallet, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/
vocabulary#wallet [https://perma.cc/SS6R-9MNC] (defining “wallet”). 
 224. This assumes the service is purely a wallet provider and does not provide additional 
value-added services, such as an exchange of U.S. dollars to virtual currency. 
 225. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 8 (reporting on a digital attack in which $1.2 million in 
bitcoins were stolen from online virtual wallets). 
 226. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.16 (2015). Cybersecurity requirements 
would include board-approved cybersecurity policy and a program to protect electronic systems 
and sensitive data, qualified chief information security officer, annual reports to NYDFS, 
annual penetration testing and audits, and maintenance of a business-continuity and disaster-
recovery plan, to be independently tested annually. Id. § 200.16(b); id. § 200.17. 
 227. Id. § 200.19. Consumer-protection requirements include the disclosure of material risks, 
including certain minimum disclosures: virtual currency is not legal tender, transactions are 
generally irreversible, and the risk of fraud, cyberattack, and total loss of value, among other 
risks. Id. 
 228. Id. § 200.14. Reports and financial disclosures 
 229. Id. § 200.15. AML requirements include initial and annual risk assessments, ten-year 
records of all transactions, suspicious activity reports, a customer identification program, Office 
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York, citing total compliance implementation costs between $50,000 
and $100,000.230 Second, the certainty of licensure decreases legal risk 
of companies operating in this space, so a smoother path will likely 
emerge for blockchain businesses to integrate with the established 
banking system. 
III.  THE BLOCKCHAIN REVISITED: THE SHAPE OF TRANSACTIONS 
TO COME 
This Part builds on the explanation of blockchain technology set 
forth in Part I and illustrates why regulations designed to “broadly 
construe[]”231 the definition of “virtual currency” may unintentionally 
engulf an entire realm of activities. First, it explains the concepts of 
“scripting” and “sidechains”232—innovations that could spawn 
additional applications for blockchain technology. Second, it surveys 
current research and experimentation at the cutting edge of 
cryptography and computer science that could impact commerce and 
on a similar order of magnitude as the Internet did. It closes by 
circling back to themes raised in Part II, exploring the challenge that 
regulators face as they seek to understand this technology. 
A. The Blockchain Revisited: Scripting and Sidechains 
Potential applications of blockchain technology are not limited 
to money transfers and payments. At its core, this protocol facilitates 
more than the exchange of “bitcoins”; it facilitates the exchange of 
value.233 Part I established a series of important mathematical rules 
 
of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) checks and compliance, annual internal or external audits, 
and no structuring to evade reporting, or obfuscating identity. Id. 
 230. Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of Bitcoin Startups from New York, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2015, 11:19 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startups-leave-new-
york-bitlicense [http://perma.cc/T3WF-QEHE] (citing at least ten companies that chose to exit 
New York, rather than incur the costs of compliance). 
 231. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p) (2015) (“Virtual Currency shall 
be broadly construed to include digital units of exchange that (i) have a centralized repository 
or administrator; (ii) are decentralized and have no centralized repository or administrator; or 
(iii) may be created or obtained by computing or manufacturing effort.”). 
 232. See BACK ET AL., supra note 33, at 5 (introducing the term “sidechain,” and describing 
it as a blockchain that is interoperable with the main Bitcoin blockchain). 
 233. Id. at 4 (“There are assets besides currencies that may be traded on blockchains, such 
as IOUs and other contracts, as well as smart property.”); Evans, supra note 106, at 1 (defining 
the blockchain as a “protocol for sending, receiving, and recording value securely”); see also 
infra Part III.B (describing some alternative applications of blockchain technology); see 
generally SWANSON, supra note 37 (discussing ways in which blockchain technology can be 
utilized to exchange things of value). 
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that govern the network. Fundamentally, transactions have a three-
part structure: (1) Party A sends a message to the network declaring 
the transaction; (2) Party B accepts the transaction by broadcasting its 
acceptance; and (3) the network participants verify the transaction’s 
authenticity.234 To be sure, this basic structure was designed for 
transferring ownership of bitcoins. But when people send and receive 
bitcoins, those bitcoins are best thought of as containers for value.235 
Like a digital envelope, these containers can carry “coins” across the 
network; but they can also transmit richer forms of information, 
holding promise for many compelling applications beyond bitcoin.236 
A typical transaction follows a simple script—a set of 
instructions—that adheres to the three-part structure described 
above.237 If the script were amended to contain additional conditions, 
users could engage in more sophisticated transactions. For instance, 
consider that Party A and Party B may want to add a fourth condition 
to that script structure: they only want the transaction to occur at a 
certain time, or upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a 
conditional event. Many possibilities branch out from this basic idea, 
and it has sparked much discussion around “smart” contracts.238 
As a practical matter, developers cannot currently implement 
scripts like this in bitcoin transactions because protocol amendments 
require a majority consensus.239 Similar to a corporate charter, default 
rules are easy to establish at the outset and much harder to change 
later on. This fact, paired with the open-source nature of the Bitcoin 
platform, has inspired dozens of “altcoins,” or alternative-utility 
iterations on blockchain technology.240 In other words, developers 
 
 234. See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 235. Evans, supra note 106, at 4 (“Calling the container a coin causes confusion because, at 
least at the start of the platform, the container is not a currency, since it is not widely used, and 
because the public ledger platform could be viable even if the container did not evolve into 
being a general-purpose currency.”). 
 236. SWANSON, supra note 37, at n.55. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See, e.g., Jay Cassano, What Are Smart Contracts? Cryptocurrency’s Killer App, FAST 
CO. LABS (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.fastcolabs.com/3035723/app-economy/smart-contracts-
could-be-cryptocurrencys-killer-app [https://perma.cc/YU3Y-MLKP] (explaining how smart-
contract projects such as Ethereum and Codius are aimed at decreasing the monitoring and 
enforcement costs inherent in contracting). 
 239. This is an economic majority of 51 percent. See supra note 105; see also SWANSON, 
supra note 37 at 18, 28 (explaining that Bitcoin Improvement Proposals require community 
consensus in order to be implemented). 
 240. See SWANSON, supra note 37, at 13 (“An altcoin means ‘alternate coin’ – which 
commonly means any cryptocoin or cryptoledger that is not Bitcoin.”). 
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with a novel vision for the ideal blockchain parameters set their own 
rules at the outset, according to a desired set of economic 
properties.241 Some examples are Litecoin, a platform similar to 
Bitcoin but with faster transaction confirmations, an ideal feature for 
high-volume merchants;242 Viacoin, a “notary” platform that time-
stamps, transfers, and verifies ownership of documents;243 and 
Storjcoin, a platform much different from Bitcoin that allows for a 
decentralized cloud storage system.244 
Despite the excitement of this unbounded innovation, a system 
of parallel blockchains is inefficient and undesirable. They also pose 
significant risks to the sustainability and goodwill of the blockchain 
experiment. Although a full discussion of these risks exceeds the 
scope of this Note, they generally fall into one or more of the 
following categories: problems of initial distribution and valuation, 
liquidity shortages, adverse network effects, market fluctuations, 
fragmentation, security breaches, pump-and-dump market games, 
and plain fraud.245 The good news, however, is that a recent 
development has shown these “worlds” of alternative-utility 
blockchains can coexist without the exchange-rate risk and other 
factors that make the current altcoin system unworkable.246 
In October 2014, a group of leading developers introduced the 
concept of “sidechains.”247 Unlike altcoins, which require users to 
leave the Bitcoin platform, exposing them to significant risks,248 
sidechains are blockchains that are interoperable with one another 
and, most importantly, interoperable with the Bitcoin blockchain.249 
 
 241. Id.  
 242. LITECOIN, http://www.litecoin.org [http://perma.cc/SVYS-9DEN]. 
 243. VIACOIN, http://viacoin.org [http://perma.cc/AGT6-6EHP]. 
 244. STORJ, http://www.storj.io [http://perma.cc/WD67-FV5L]. 
 245. See BACK ET AL., supra note 33, at 5 (describing these as problems with bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies); see also William J. Luther, Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, and 
Switching Costs (Kenyon Coll., Mercatus Center Working Paper No. 13-17) (July 17, 2013) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal) (analyzing the adverse impact of network effects and switching 
costs with respect to blockchain-based currencies like bitcoin). Given the legitimate policy 
issues around such “vaporware”—technology that is promised, but never fully developed—
future scholarship in this area might consider whether the federal securities laws provide an 
appropriate mechanism for investor protection, particularly when such technology is centrally 
administered. 
 246. See generally BACK ET AL., supra note 33 (suggesting “sidechains” as a tool for avoiding 
these problems). 
 247. Id. at 1. 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 245. 
 249. BACK ET AL., supra note 33, at 5, 8. 
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By integrating with Bitcoin’s blockchain, sidechains provide the 
benefits of altcoins without the accompanying risks. Such purpose-
specific scripting will encourage further innovation250 by allowing for a 
network of “distributed trust systems.”251 
B. Decentralized Smart Contracts and the Shape of Transactions to 
Come 
Sidechains and scripting are changing how people think about 
blockchain technology. One broad area of innovation around these 
features is decentralized smart contracts.252 Smart contracts are 
“computer protocols that facilitate, verify, execute and enforce the 
terms of a commercial agreement.”253 This concept is not new and is 
not unique to the blockchain. One primitive example is digital rights 
management (DRM), a technology developed to fight copyright 
infringement.254 DRM technology essentially embedded U.S. 
copyright law into digital files by limiting the user’s ability to view, 
copy, play, print, or otherwise alter the works.255 In other words, 
digital audio files encrypted with DRM technology were not subject 
to the double-spending problem because they contained a basic smart 
contract, one that referenced a centralized network, (that is, Apple’s 
server programmed to enforce the iTunes Store Terms and 
Conditions).256 
The blockchain enables decentralized smart contracts—in other 
words, smart contracts that leverage a secure public ledger as an 
enforcement mechanism.257 In contrast to the iTunes example, these 
 
 250. See id. at 7 (“[B]ecause sidechains are still blockchains independent of Bitcoin, they are 
free to experiment with new transaction designs, trust models, economic models, asset issuance 
semantics, or cryptographic features.”). 
 251. Id. at 7. One expansive way to conceptualize the blockchain innovation is through the 
concept of “trustlessness”—the property of enabling all parties to verify on their own that 
information is correct without relying on trusting external parties for correct operation. Id. 
 252. See SWANSON, supra note 37, at 15–16 (introducing the concept of smart contracts and 
discussing their potential usefulness).  
 253. Id. at 11. 
 254. ROSS ANDERSON, SECURITY ENGINEERING 679 (2d ed. 2008); see also Timothy K. 
Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 
60 (2008) (explaining the evolution of DRM technology). 
 255. Armstrong, supra note 254, at 60. 
 256. In 2009, Apple changed its policy and no longer provides DRM-encrypted digital files 
in its iTunes store. See Ruth Suehle, The DRM Graveyard: A Brief History of Digital Rights 
Management in Music, OPENSOURCE.COM (Nov. 3, 2011), http://opensource.com/life/11/11/drm-
graveyard-brief-history-digital-rights-management-music [http://perma.cc/F94Q-3JDK]. 
 257. For an extended discussion on decentralized smart contracts, see SWANSON, supra note 
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contracts do not rely on a third-party institution or server for 
centralized recordkeeping and enforcement. Because blockchain 
transactions are programmable and self-enforcing, parties might use 
smart contracts to design contractual relationships that are 
automatically executed without the additional costs of monitoring or 
enforcement. 
This fact is significant. Intermediaries typically establish trust and 
reduce risk between counterparties to a transaction.258 But with 
decentralized smart contracts, parties may transact at arms length, 
with total strangers, without the worry of fraud, and without the cost 
of third-party enforcement (that is, recordkeeping costs, mediation 
costs, and other administrative and operational costs). In other words, 
decentralized smart contracts allow for new markets to develop: 
disintermediated contract markets in which parties do not have 
concern for counterparty risk.259 
Consider a smart-contracts market for futures trading.260 Smart 
contracts in this market would be simple for two reasons. First, 
futures agreements involve objectively verifiable conditions about the 
state of the world—for example, the price of crude oil at a given time 
on the New York Mercantile Exchange. And second, futures 
agreements are highly standardized to ensure that contracts can be 
easily traded and priced.261 Such an agreement would be self-
 
37, at 15–30. 
 258. DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 6 (1990). 
 259. Counterparty risk is the risk arising from the possibility that the counterparty may 
default on amounts owed on a transaction. THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & 
FINANCE 502 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1992). 
 260. For an extended analysis of smart contract markets and futures trading, see generally 
Trevor I. Kiviat, “Smart” Contract Markets: Trading Derivatives on the Blockchain (Apr. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.academia.edu/10766594 [http://perma.cc/2K8A-4HAW]. 
 261. CME GROUP, A TRADER’S GUIDE TO FUTURES 4 (2013), https://www.cmegroup.com/
education/files/a-traders-guide-to-futures.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ASG-6G3T]; see also Stephen G. 
Cecchetti, Jacob Gyntelberg & Marc Hollanders, Central Counterparties for Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2009, at 45, 49 (“[D]erivatives contracts have in many cases 
become more standardised. For example, over the years, interest rate swaps and foreign 
exchange derivatives have become highly standardised through voluntary industry initiatives.”). 
This model is based on a hypothetical developed by Professor Houman B. Shadab in his 
remarks to the CFTC’s Global Markets Advisory Committee. Houman B. Shadab, Professor of 
Law, New York Law School, Regulating Bitcoin and Block Chain Derivatives: Written 
Statement to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 15 (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.
cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_100914_bitcoin.pdf [http://perma.
cc/XL9G-5WXU]. 
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monitoring and self-enforcing through a combination of scripting,262 
multi-sig,263 and oracles, systems set up to monitor off-blockchain 
information and data that is essential to the effective execution of the 
smart contract’s terms.264 
In sum, the technology’s potential to lower transaction costs with 
respect to contracting and transferring title to physical and personal 
property should generate special interest in the legal community. To 
be sure, there are challenges. First, the task of encoding the legal 
subtleties and nuances that underlie even the most basic contract 
poses significant programming challenges. And second, it is not clear 
whether and how smart contracts fit within the legal frameworks of 
the Uniform Commercial Code and general common law. Although 
an extended discussion of these two issues is beyond the scope of this 
Note, their serious analysis would add much to this nascent field. 
CONCLUSION 
Blockchain technology is adaptable and policymakers must view 
it as such. Regulation designed to mitigate the risks of such a 
powerful technology should be encouraged. However, policymakers 
should exercise caution and precision in tailoring the scope of 
regulation. As illustrated above, blockchain technology has utility 
beyond transmitting value in the traditional money-transmitter sense. 
Regulation aimed at the blockchain’s money-transfer and payment 
functionalities must not create an unintentional chilling effect on this 
second category of functionalities. 
States should monitor New York’s BitLicense experiment and 
consider the issues raised in this Note as they consider their own 
models.265 .For example, the NYDFS has recognized that BitLicense is 
 
 262. See supra Part III.A. 
 263. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 264. “Off-blockchain” events are any measurable events that occur outside of the 
blockchain and thus cannot be monitored by an on-blockchain script. The current temperature 
in Durham, North Carolina; the spot price of Brent crude at a particular time in the future; and 
the results of the 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament are all off-blockchain events that 
could be referenced in a smart contract and enforced by an oracle. 
 265. It is likely that many such codes will be based on the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors Draft Model Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Activities. See CONF. 
STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
ACTIVITIES: CSBS MODEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.csbs.org/
regulatory/ep/Documents/CSBS-Model-Regulatory-Framework%28September%2015%202015
%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/USP3-U5WX]. 
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intended only to apply to financial intermediaries.266This Note 
highlighted some ambiguity around “nonfinancial” use language.267 
Further, depending on particular alternative applications of 
blockchain technology, some additional guidance and regulation may 
need to occur outside of the BSA and state banking frameworks. For 
example, smart contracts that enable equity crowdfunding268 should fit 
squarely in the domain of federal securities law, triggering 
registration and disclosure requirements and subjecting participants 
to SEC enforcement rules. In other words, policymakers must 
carefully define the specific activities that they seek to regulate. A 
basic understanding of the concepts set forth in this Note would be a 
strong starting point. To borrow from technologist Mark Stefik’s 
words on the Internet, blockchain technology can support different 
kinds of dreams: “We choose, wisely or not.”269  
 
 
 266. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 39. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See SWANSON, supra note 37, at 83 (describing “crowdequity” as a potential tool for 
incentivizing early adoption by giving an equity stake to early users). 
 269. Mark J. Stefik, Epilogue: Choices and Dreams, in INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, 
MYTHS, AND METAPHORS 390 (Mark J. Stefik ed. 1996). 
